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INTRODUCTION
Many in the utility industry nationwide are increasingly con-
cerned about the concept of a “death spiral” whereby new technologies are
changing the nature of the customer relationship with their local electric
utility.1 Such technologies include most prominently rooftop and commu-
nity solar arrays, which can reduce, or in some cases in conjunction with
battery storage technologies, eliminate the necessity for electric service.2
Industry commentators have compared the disruptive effects of
this change to the telecommunications industry revolution when land-
lines gave way to cell phones, leaving stranded customers who did not
make the switch with the burden of paying more for legacy and outdated
infrastructure.3 Appropriately, there is concern that if similar impacts
were to take place in the electric utility industry, customers unable to
access new technologies would be likewise stranded, paying for the costs
of legacy transmission infrastructure such as poles and wires. Spreading
the fixed costs of a legacy system over a shrinking number of customers
and a declining load would mean higher bills for those left behind.4
This Article takes a different view of the disruption taking place,
positing that utilities have an opportunity through new technologies to
meet customer needs and environmental imperatives while also building
a sustainable business model for the future. While much of the focus
around emerging technologies is on those such as solar, which reduce the
need for utility load, there should be an equal or greater focus by utilities
1 See Future of Retail Rate Design, EDISON ELEC. INST. 2, 8 (Eric Ackerman & Paul De
Martini, eds., 2012) http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/stateregulation/Documents/Fu
ture%20of%20Retail%20Rate%20Design%20v4%20021713%20eta%20-%20pjd2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F57B-99YY] (laying out the challenges faced by the investor-owned
utility industry, as seen by the industry’s own trade association).
2 Id. at 3.
3 Id. at 8.
4 See Mark Chediak & Ken Wells, Why the U.S. Power Grid’s Days Are Numbered,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 22, 2013, 7:11 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-08
-22/why-the-u-dot-s-dot-power-grids-days-are-numbered [https://perma.cc/35ZN-MP2E].
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on technologies that build beneficial load such as electric and plug-in
hybrid vehicles and air source heat pumps. Expanding the use of these
types of technologies through strategic electrification of the heating and
transportation sectors offers the potential in states like Vermont (with
a relatively clean electric supply) to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
while saving customers money.5 Further, with careful planning and
supportive but balanced policies, these technologies offer the utility an
opportunity to provide new value to customers, and create a new purpose
for utility regulation in helping to meet 21st century state and national
greenhouse gas emission targets.
Part I of this Article provides a brief history of 20th century
utility regulation, including the genesis of the so-called natural monopoly
for electric utility service. Part II explores the disruption currently taking
place in the electric utility sector, through increasing adoption of customer-
sited technologies that reduce or affect electric load. These include solar
and energy efficiency technologies. Part II also discusses the concept of
the utility death spiral. Part III discusses the opportunity for a new way
of thinking about the change and disruption, with a particular focus on
the ability of utilities to build beneficial load and offer new services that
address the loss of load from the death spiral. Part III also examines
policies that enable utilities to build market share in the thermal and
transportation sectors through new and disruptive technologies, focusing
on Vermont’s 2015 Renewable Energy Standard as an example. Finally,
Part III proposes principles for utility-led energy transformation in the
21st century and discusses why electric utilities are the correct and in
some ways indispensable entities to undertake this challenge.
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATION AND POLICY
IN UNITED STATES
A. Electric Light
The 19th Century saw many discoveries and inventions, including
major progress in using electricity. This followed on the research and exper-
iments of many in the 18th Century, including, famously, Ben Franklin.6
5 See Brian Buckley, Vermont Embarks Upon Landmark Strategic Electrification Pro-
gram, NE. ENERGY EFFICIENCY P’SHIPS (Dec. 18, 2015, 12:25 PM), http://www.neep.org
/blog/vermont-embarks-upon-landmark-strategic-electrification-program [https://perma
.cc/6B3B-PUNS].
6 WALTER ISAACSON, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: AN AMERICAN LIFE 141–43 (2003).
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Many inventors and entrepreneurs in the late 19th Century
sought to create a practical light bulb powered by electricity.7 Thomas
Edison, and his research team at Menlo Park, New Jersey, are often
credited with making such an invention, although the author Ernest
Freeberg states he should not be solely credited with such an invention.8
In his book, Freeberg details the dangers of the early use of electricity,
including electrocution, and the competition between gas lights (referred
to as “town light”) and electric light for street lighting.9 Before they
became widely adopted in homes, the electric lights made cities safer and
more attractive in the evening, and offered the opportunity for factories
to run a second or third shift to improve productivity of their capital
investments.10
Edison, with coal brought to his power plant by horse-drawn
wagon, used steam generators to light up a square mile of New York City
in 1882.11 Edison’s initial advantage was dimmed by his reliance on
direct current (“DC”) power for his lights, whereby his competitor George
Westinghouse (relying on patents from Nikola Tesla, who originally worked
for Edison) used alternating current (“AC”), which became the industry
standard.12 Westinghouse, using Tesla’s designs, was able to harness
power from the Niagara Falls and generate hydroelectric energy.13 Edi-
son’s work, however, spawned electric light utilities and led as well to the
creation of the company that became General Electric.14
7 See ERNEST FREEBERG, AGE OF EDISON: ELECTRIC LIGHT AND THE INVENTION OF MODERN
AMERICA 158–59 (2014).
8 Brooke Berger, Many Minds Produced The Light That Illuminated America, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REPORT (Mar. 21, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2013/03
/21/why-thomas-edison-isnt-the-inventor-of-the-light-bulb [https://perma.cc/QWL7-PEA4].
9 FREEBERG, supra note 7, at 79–83.
10 See Berger, supra note 8.
11 See Emily S. Rueb, How New York City Gets Its Electricity, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/02/10/nyregion/how-new-york-city-gets-its
-electricity-power-grid.html?_r=0 [https://web.archive.org/web/20170916010933/https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/02/10/nyregion/how-new-york-city-gets-its-electricity
-power-grid.html?_r=0%20].
12 Gilbert King, Edison vs. Westinghouse: A Shocking Rivalry, SMITHSONIAN (Oct. 11,
2011), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/edison-vs-westinghouse-a-shocking-rivalry
-102146036/ [https://perma.cc/9DAY-NRZU].
13 Rueb, supra note 11.
14 See Richard D. Cudahy & William D. Henderson, From Insull to Enron: Corporate
(Re)Regulation After the Rise and Fall of Two Energy Icons, 26 ENERGY L.J. 35, 39–41
(2005), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/insull.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3DHC-W39V].
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B. The Natural Monopoly
General Electric manufactured electric products, but one of Edi-
son’s top employees, Samuel Insull, decided that his future lay in the
generation and distribution of electricity.15 In 1892 he left General Electric
to become head of Chicago Edison, a utility which he grew while adding
more generating capacity and cutting rates to attract customers.16 Insull
was among the first to have the insight that by creating varying de-
mands (through, for example, electric appliances that needed energy at
different times of day than lights) he could, like the factory owner, es-
sentially run a second or third shift on the grid and derive more revenue
from the same fixed infrastructure.17 Insull’s other major contribution,
both as head of Chicago Edison and as President of the National Electric
Light Association (a predecessor organization to the current Edison
Electric Institute), was pushing for a new business model for utilities.18
Insull argued as early as 1898 that the electric utility industry
was paying a high price for capital and enduring harmful competition for
redundant infrastructure, which meant customers did not receive the
best price for the end product.19 He advocated for monopoly franchises in
geographic areas with protections for the consuming public and for
investors.20 Insull found the utility industry to be a natural monopoly,
which should rely on economies of scale from one provider in a service
territory, instead of competition among providers, to lower prices for
consumers.21 With regulation to ensure fair pricing and cost-recovery, the
utility would be more efficient and provide a lower price when given a
monopoly than competition could deliver in the same area.22 The result-
ing rate of return regulation sought to ensure utility investment through
a return on capital assets to investors/shareholders.23
15 Id. at 41.
16 Id. at 41–44.
17 Id. at 46–50.
18 Id. at 46.
19 Id.
20 Cudahy & Henderson, supra note 14, at 46.
21 See Steve Corneli & Steve Kihm, Will distributed energy end the utility natural
monopoly?, ELEC. POL’Y 1, 2 (June 2016), https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/Corneli_29June
2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/XYP3-WJFT].
22 Id.
23 See, e.g., Kristin Ralff-Douglas & Marzia Zafar,, ELECTRIC UTILITY BUSINESS AND REGU-
LATORY MODELS, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N 1, 6–7 (2015), http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploaded
Files/CPUC_Public_Website/Content/About_Us/Organization/Divisions/Policy_and_Plan
ning/PPD_Work/PPDElectricUtilityBusinessModels.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2VX-MR3Q].
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State commission regulation of utilities focused (and still does) on
efforts to provide just and reasonable rates to consumers, and to ensure
that in-service facilities be useful and prudently invested in before their
costs can be passed on in rates to consumers known as ratepayers.24
Regulation seeks to ensure prices reflect the cost of service.25
Insull built up a large utility sector interest through leveraged
holding companies, but his holdings eventually collapsed.26 He was accused
of gouging consumers, drew negative publicity from contributing large
cash payments to the U.S. Senate campaign of Illinois’ top utility regula-
tor, and he faced criminal charges following the stock market crash in the
late 1920s and a financing crunch in the early 1930s.27 New Deal reforms
aimed at addressing political influence of the utility industry (drawing
on findings from a Federal Trade Commission investigation) changed the
holding company structure, created new public power authorities such
as the Tennessee Valley Authority, introduced federal rate regulation of
wholesale transactions, and supported rural electrification.28
C. The Modern Era of Utility Regulation
1. Nuclear Buildout
Insull’s push for larger generation sources, more demand, and
economies of scale played out as he would have expected, with nominal
electric prices declining from 1925 to 1970.29
The utility industry saw relatively few major innovations during
that time, but toward the end of that period there was an effort to build
large, capital-intensive nuclear plants.30 Initially marketed as being the
next phase in the push for economy of scale, the nuclear buildout lost
24 See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow, Regulatory Failure, Regulatory Reform, and Structural
Change in the Electrical Power Industry, BROOKINGS PAPERS: MICROECONOMICS 125, 135
(1989), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/1989/01/1989_bpeamicro_joskow
.pdf [https://perma.cc/YXC7-SXTY].
25 Id.
26 Cudahy & Henderson, supra note 14, at 56–57.
27 Id. at 56–77. Following a Senate investigation on the campaign financing activities in
the Illinois Senate race that prevented the utility regulator, Frank Smith, from taking
his seat even after his election, U.S. Senator George Norris of Nebraska said Illinois was
not being deprived of its votes in the Senate, but that it was “a question of Mr. Insull
being deprived of his votes in the Senate.” Id. at 61.
28 Id. at 56–77.
29 See Joskow, supra note 24, at 153.
30 Cudahy & Henderson, supra note 14, at 78.
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momentum midstream due in part to cost overruns and delays.31 Dozens
of plants were cancelled, and no new plants were ordered after 1978 until
very recently.32 Notably the Seabrook nuclear plant’s cost increases in
New Hampshire caused a bankruptcy for one of the utilities invested in it,
the first significant public utility bankruptcy since the Great Depression.33
The cost overruns and cancellations continue for the few new reactors
ordered in the 21st century, with two reactors less than half built in South
Carolina recently cancelled after utilities spent $9 billion on them (account-
ing for 18% of residential customer bills for one of the utilities involved).34
2. Federal Landscape for Efficiency and Renewable Energy
In addition to state regulation, and federal reforms during the
New Deal era, the utility sector and energy sector have been affected by
federal tax and spending decisions. Federal tax policy and federal energy
funding and policies have long-favored fossil fuel development and nuclear
energy development.35 According to a non-partisan report prepared by the
Congressional Research Service (“CRS”), “[h]istorically, federal energy
31 Id.
32 Lee A. Daniels, Bankruptcy Filed by Leading Utility in Seabrook Plant, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 29, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/01/29/business/bankruptcy-filed-by-leading
-utility-in-seabrook-plant.html?pagewanted=all [https://web.archive.org/web/20160329
153634/http://www.nytimes.com/1988/01/29/business/bankruptcy-filed-by-leading-utility
-in-seabrook-plant.html?pagewanted=all].
33 Id.
34 Recently new nuclear plants were ordered in Georgia and South Carolina; however,
consistent with the previous experience, cost overruns and delays have occurred. See
Russell Grantham, Who pays Vogtle’s higher costs? Mostly you, Georgia regulator
decides., ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Dec. 20, 2016), http://www.ajc.com/business/who-pays-vogtle
-higher-costs-mostly-you-georgia-regulator-decides/DEIS6cSLQfS5De0MaWKbIJ/
[https://perma.cc/4PQX-M6UX]; Harriet McLeod, South Carolina commission okays cost
overruns for nuclear plants, REUTERS (Sept. 2, 2015, 6:16 PM), http://www.reuters.com
/article/us-energy-nuclear-south-carolina-idUSKCN0R22H020150902 [https://perma.cc
/RF3H-Y9VJ]. Ultimately, the South Carolina plants were cancelled after costing the
utilities involved $9 billion and reaching only 40% completion. See Brad Plumer, U.S.
Nuclear Comeback Stalls as Two Reactors Are Abandoned, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/31/climate/nuclear-power-project-canceled-in-south
-carolina.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20170827055556/https://www.nytimes.com
/2017/07/31/climate/nuclear-power-project-canceled-in-south-carolina.html].
35 SALVATORE LAZZARI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33578, ENERGY TAX POLICY: HISTORY
& CURRENT ISSUES (2008), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33578.pdf [https://
perma.cc/C99Z-RMLX], and FRED SISSINE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22858, RENEWABLE
ENERGY R&D FUNDING HISTORY: A COMPARISON WITH FUNDING FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY,
FOSSIL ENERGY, AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY R&D (2016), available at http://nationalaglaw
center.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/RS22858.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YGW-4QT5].
50 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 42:43
tax policy was focused on increasing domestic oil and gas reserves and
production; there were no tax incentives for energy conservation or for
alternative fuels.”36 Likewise analysis by CRS shows that nearly 75% of
all Department of Energy research and development funding since 1948
has gone to nuclear energy and fossil fuels, with just 10.3% for energy
efficiency and only 12.3% for solar, wind, biomass, geothermal, and
hydropower combined.37 Nuclear plants receive subsidies throughout
their lifespan and benefit from unique subsidies such as Price-Anderson
insurance and decommissioning benefits.38
Over the latter third of the 20th Century and into the 21st Cen-
tury, national and state energy policies began to consider distributed and
renewable energy, as well as energy efficiency, to deal with emerging
environmental issues and energy market concerns. Following the oil
crises in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Congress enacted the Public
Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (“PURPA”).39 PURPA opened the utility
market to qualifying small generators including renewable sources as
well as cogeneration plants.40 PURPA has historically promoted renew-
able energy development, and in Vermont for example it helped support
development of a number of small hydropower projects by independent
producers in the 1980s.41 While new avenues have opened to support
merchant renewable energy projects, some developers continue to look
to PURPA for access to power markets.42
More recently federal and state policies have begun to bring some
balance to the playing field for energy efficiency technologies and renewable
energy on tax policy and access to markets. It should be noted, however,
that support for these technologies does not come close to the historical
36 LAZZARI, supra note 35.
37 Id.
38 Doug Koplow, Nuclear Power: Still Not Viable without Subsidies, UNION OF CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS at 7, 77–78 (2011), http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/docu
ments/nuclear_power/nuclear_subsidies_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7DY-9KLG].
39 Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (1978)); see also Peter Maloney, PURPA’s puzzle: FERC
Workshop Revisits 1978 Law, Embattled as Ever, UTIL. DIVE (July 28, 2016), http://www
.utilitydive.com/news/purpas-puzzle-ferc-workshop-revisits-1978-law-embattled-as-ever
/423005/ [https://perma.cc/AF3G-2S52].
40 Maloney, supra note 39.
41 See VT. DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., ACT 165 REPORT: A BIENNIAL REPORT TO THE VERMONT
GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON PROCEDURES FOR FACILITATING DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL AND
MICRO HYDROELECTRIC PROJECTS at 2 (2016), http://legislature.vermont.gov/assets/Legis
lative-Reports/Act-165-Legislative-Report-Final-011516.pdf [https://perma.cc/BDM4-762N]
(noting Vermont saw forty-one PURPA hydro projects developed).
42 Maloney, supra note 39.
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support provided for their incumbent competitors in fossil fuels and
nuclear, or provide full parity today even as concerns regarding climate
change have focused greater attention on the need for clean technolo-
gies.43 With that said, several policies have promoted efficiency and re-
newable energy and contributed to a changed utility landscape.
Federal incentives passed in the late 1970s and early 1980s began
to offer support for energy efficient technologies, alternative fuels, and
solar and wind.44
In 1992 the federal production tax credit for wind and certain
biomass systems came into effect.45 That tax credit, while effective in
spurring wind energy installations, has been allowed to expire multiple
times and in the years it expired installations dropped between 73% and
93%.46 This contrasts sharply with certain oil and gas tax benefits which
date back to the early 20th Century and remain in effect today.47 Cur-
rently the production tax credit for wind is on a phase down and is set to
expire.48 Another important federal incentive is the Investment Tax
Credit, which has particularly supported the buildout of solar photovol-
taic systems.49 That credit is also now on a phase down.50
43 See Nancy Pfund & Ben Healey, What Would Jefferson Do?, DLB INVESTORS 1, 6 (Sept.
2011), http://www.dblpartners.vc/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/What-Would-Jefferson-Do-2
.4.pdf?597435&48d1ff [https://perma.cc/G28B-Y33Y]; see also SISSINE, supra note 35, at 3.
44 LAZZARI, supra note 35.
45 Id. See also Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified in
relevant part at 26 U.S.C. § 45).
46 Stephen Lacey, Another Boom-Bust Cycle? Wind Installations Surge In Anticipation
of Tax Credit Expiration, THINK PROGRESS (Sept. 27, 2011, 4:11 PM), https://thinkprog
ress.org/another-boom-bust-cycle-wind-installations-surge-in-anticipation-of-tax-credit
-expiration-c9e9fb7f1356#.5ruw9ejv4 [https://perma.cc/4B66-BKZE].
47 Timeline History of Natural Gas and Oil Tax Provisions, Indep. Petroleum Assoc. of Am.
(2009), http://www.ipaa.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/01/2009-04-TimelineHis
toryofNaturalGasandOilTaxProvisions.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/20140805063914
/http://www.ipaa.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/01/2009-04-TimelineHistory
ofNaturalGasandOilTaxProvisions.pdf]; Alex Park et al., Triumph of the Drill: How Big
Oil Clings to Billions in Government Giveaways, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 14, 2014, 10:00 AM),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/04/oil-subsidies-renewable-energy-tax-breaks
[https://perma.cc/Z32R-MWY9].
48 See Julia Pyper, Treasury Nominee Backs Existing Phaseout of the Wind Energy Tax
Credit, GREENTECH MEDIA (Jan. 24, 2017) (noting current administration’s support for
phase out of production tax credit).
49 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as amended at
26 U.S.C. § 48).
50 Gavin Bade, Congress strikes deal to extend wind, solar tax credits and lift oil export ban,
UTILITY DIVE (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/congress-strikes-deal-to
-extend-wind-solar-tax-credits-and-lift-oil-export/410947/ [https://perma.cc/EB76-9ELY].
52 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 42:43
Energy efficiency tax credits have likewise appeared and disap-
peared from the federal tax code.51 However, certain federal standards for
energy efficiency, such as new lighting standards and new fuel economy
standards for automobiles authorized in energy legislation from 2007,
have been very impactful in reducing energy use.52 There are also cur-
rently incentives for plug-in and electric vehicles from the federal govern-
ment that expire as automakers use up their allotment.53 Finally it
should be noted that many Obama administration regulatory initiatives
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are being rolled back by the Trump
administration, which also withdrew the United States from the global
Paris Agreement regarding emissions reduction.54 Nevertheless, develop-
ment of renewable energy and increased use of natural gas has signifi-
cantly reduced the amount of coal used to generate electricity in the
United States and contributed to a cleaner grid.55
3. State Utility Policies and Deregulation
In the late 1990s and early 21st century there was a push to de-
regulate utilities and create separation between entities that deliver
power to customers and entities that generate and transmit power to
51 See MARGOT L. CRANDALL-HOLLICK & MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.
R42089, RESIDENTIAL ENERGY TAX CREDITS: OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS (2016), available
at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42089.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HMG-JY48] (noting residen-
tial energy tax credits from the 1970s expired in 1985).
52 See Colleen L.S. Kantner et al., Impact of the EISA 2007 Energy Efficiency Standard
on General Service Lamps, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB. (2017), https://eta.lbl.gov
/sites/all/files/publications/lbnl_1007090rev.pdf [https://perma.cc/72HY-PAVD] (finding
that federal lighting efficiency standards are projected to reduce energy consumptions
by twenty-seven quads and save consumers a net present value of $120 billion). See also
A Brief History of U.S. Fuel Efficiency Standards, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
(2017), http://www.ucsusa.org/clean-vehicles/fuel-efficiency/fuel-economy-basics.html#
.WJ4u4VUrJhE [https://perma.cc/25LT-AK43].
53 Kristy Hartman, State Efforts to Promote Hybrid and Electric Vehicles, NAT’L CONF. OF
STATE LEG. (Dec. 3, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/state-electric-vehicle-in
centives-state-chart.aspx [https://perma.cc/9M4E-2QZN].
54 Somini Sengupta et al., As Trump Exits Paris Agreement, Other Nations Are Defiant,
N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/world/europe/climate-paris
-agreement-trump-china.html [https://perma.cc/5S6M-3B6D]; Richard Valdmanis, States
Challenge Trump over Clean Power Plan, REUTERS (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.sci
entificamerican.com/article/states-challenge-trump-over-clean-power-plan/ [https://perma
.cc/U4A7-YVKU].
55 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ENERGY-RELATED CO2 EMISSIONS FOR FIRST SIX MONTHS
OF 2016 ARE LOWEST SINCE 1991 (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail
.php?id=28312 [https://perma.cc/TPN7-ECXF].
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markets. While traditionally states regulated vertically integrated utilities
which owned generation, transmission, and distribution while offering
retail service to customers, deregulation changed that in some states in
the 1990s.56 Reforms at the federal level based on changes in the natural
gas industry, enabled some states to separate retail and distribution
service from generation and transmission to promote choice and competi-
tion.57 However, the California energy crisis and the Enron bankruptcy
(which was compared by some to Insull’s failures decades earlier) slowed
the move toward deregulation, leaving some states fully vertically inte-
grated (such as Vermont) and others in various stages of deregulation.58
State policies have supported renewable energy through incentives
and funding, but also more crucially through net metering and renewable
portfolio standards (“RPS”). An RPS is, according to the National Renew-
able Energy Laboratory, “a mandate to increase the use of wind, solar, bio-
mass, and other alternatives to fossil and nuclear electric generation.”59
Twenty-nine states have mandatory RPS policies, while another eight have
goals around renewable electric generation.60 These vary greatly, with some
states putting a premium or specific requirement on certain renewable
resources. In Texas, wind has dominated the RPS, so there is a premium
for non-wind resources.61 In Massachusetts there is a premium on solar.62
States have similar policies to RPS in some cases for energy effi-
ciency, requiring a certain amount of efficiency investment or savings in
a given year.63
56 Cudahy & Henderson, supra note 14, at 81–83.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 108–09. See also U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., STATE ELECTRIC RETAIL CHOICE
PROGRAMS ARE POPULAR WITH COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL CUSTOMERS (May 14, 2012),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=6250 [https://perma.cc/7B5N-5XQH].
59 David Hurlbut, State Clean Energy Practices: Renewable Portfolio Standards, NAT’L
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB. (2008), http://www.nrel.gov/tech_deployment/state_local_gov
ernments/pdfs/43512.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RP8-3EUE].
60 See Jocelyn Durkay, State Renewable Portfolio Standards and Goals, NAT’L CONF. OF
STATE LEG. (Dec. 28, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/renewable-portfolio-stan
dards.aspx [https://perma.cc/N2QZ-VF3P].
61 Renewable Generation Requirement, DSIRE: N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CENTER
(Apr. 29, 2016), http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/182 [https://perma.cc
/7BGE-6PR3].
62 Solar Renewable Energy Certificates (SREC-II), U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (last visited
Oct. 23, 2017), https://energy.gov/savings/solar-renewable-energy-certificates-srec-ii [https://
perma.cc/6SEP-EDG4].
63 See Energy Efficiency Resource Standards (EERS), AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-
EFFICIENT ECONOMY (last visited Oct. 23, 2017), http://aceee.org/topics/energy-efficiency
-resource-standard-eers [https://perma.cc/6T7B-D6WB].
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Many states also offer net metering programs, which allow cus-
tomers to site renewable energy on their property using the energy on-site
and feeding excess back to the grid.64
II. DISRUPTION
A. Death of the Old Model
The regulatory model of the natural monopoly envisioned by
Insull is finally coming undone in the 21st Century. Today competing
technologies offered by third-party vendors provide customers the oppor-
tunity to reduce their electric use or even disconnect from the grid in
some instances, and as the Edison Electric Institute (“EEI”) points out,
load growth projections are essentially flat.65
The Insull model for utility regulation and economies of scale
rested on ever larger demand and ever larger power plants. Energy
efficiency and distributed generation resources (such as customer-sited
solar net metering projects) have destroyed the notion of an ever growing
demand.66 This is a relatively new phenomena. As recently as 2001, Vice
President Dick Cheney’s energy task force projected significant demand
growth for electricity consumption and the Vice President recommended
building 1,300 to 1,900 new central electric generation power plants over
a twenty-year period to avoid reliability issues.67 Cheney derided the role
64 State Net Metering Policies, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEG. (Nov. 3, 2016), http://www.ncsl
.org/research/energy/net-metering-policy-overview-and-state-legislative-updates.aspx
[https://perma.cc/B8P3-W8PJ].
65 Future of Retail Rate Design, supra note 1, at 2 (noting load growth through 2035 at
approximate projection of less than 1% annually). See also Dave Gram, Solar power and
batteries may keep Vermont charged for climate change, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD
(Dec. 25, 2016), http://www.pressherald.com/2016/12/25/solar-power-and-batteries-may
-keep-vermont-charged-for-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/F7S6-2PVQ].
66 See Future of Retail Rate Design, supra note 1, at 2 (citing customer efficiency, demand
management, and on-site generation contributing to flat load growth projections).
67 See Dick Cheney, U.S. Vice President, Remarks by the Vice President at the Annual
Meeting of the Associated Press (Apr. 30, 2001), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.ar
chives.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/text/vp20010430.html [https://perma
.cc/9R77-MM2W] (recommending construction of one new power plant on average, every
week, for twenty years); Don Van Natta, Jr. & Neela Banerjee, Top G.O.P. Donors in
Energy Industry Met Cheney Panel, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com
/2002/03/01/us/top-gop-donors-in-energy-industry-met-cheney-panel.html [https://perma
.cc/G3GZ-H6PP] (noting the Cheney Energy Task Force recommendation of building
1,300 to 1,900 electric plants to meet demand over the next two decades).
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of efficiency and conservation, saying “[c]onservation may be a sign of
personal virtue, but it is not a sufficient basis all by itself for sound,
comprehensive energy policy.”68
Following the Cheney recommendations, 200 coal plants were pro-
posed by utilities, but efforts such as the Beyond Coal campaign of the
Sierra Club, along with new environmental regulations and cheap natural
gas prices, helped block the vast majority of those proposed plants, while
sending approximately one-third of the existing coal fleet into retirement.69
Efficiency and conservation, it turns out, have had a major impact
on the need to build those 1,300 to 1,900 new power plants the Cheney
task force recommended. Total retail electricity sales in 2015 were lower
than in 2007, an accomplishment linked to utility investment in efficiency
increasing fourfold during that time period.70 From building energy codes
to appliance standards to demand side management programs, efficiency
is credited for up to 75% of the increase in energy productivity (energy
inputs to Gross Domestic Product) since the year 1970.71
B. Stranded Costs and the Death Spiral
If utilities do not have an ever growing demand to satisfy with
new power plant investments, they do, argues Edison Electric, have a need
to invest in infrastructure to accommodate the new intermittent distrib-
uted energy resources such as solar and wind.72 According to EEI investor-
owned utilities are spending $21 billion a year for grid upgrades.73
Indeed, wind, solar, and other renewables provided twenty-four
gigawatts of new generating capacity to the U.S. grid in 2016 alone, and
renewables have comprised more than half of all new power plant capacity
68 Cheney, supra note 67.
69 See Michael Grunwald, Inside the war on coal, POLITICO (May 26, 2015, 11:45 PM),
http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/05/inside-war-on-coal-000002 [https://perma
.cc/R8AL-3PDJ].
70 See Joe Romm, U.S. Electricity Sales Dropped In 2015 For Fifth Time In 8 Years,
THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 15, 2016, 6:08 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/u-s-electricity-sales
-dropped-in-2015-for-fifth-time-in-8-years-ac1050d3b800 [https://perma.cc/K72X-ER37]
(citing Energy Information Administration data that demonstrates a first-ever decoupling
between positive gross domestic product growth and flat or declining electricity demand).
71 ALL. COMM’N ON NAT’L ENERGY EFFICIENCY POL’Y, THE HISTORY OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY
1, 4 (2013), https://www.ase.org/sites/ase.org/files/resources/Media%20browser/ee_com
mission_history_report_2-1-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQ2H-WEA8].
72 Future of Retail Rate Design, supra note 1, at 2.
73 Id.
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for three years running.74 Investor-owned utilities are regulated to have
a total revenue requirement, which includes the cost of pass-through
expenses such as fuel and taxes as well as a rate of return on capital
investments.75 EEI argues that adoption of new distributed energy tech-
nologies requires capital investments to improve the grid at a time utilities
as a whole have lower credit ratings and stagnant sales.76 However, if the
only meaningful change to utilities as a result of moving to distributed
renewable energy was a shift from power plant investment to distribu-
tion infrastructure investment that would probably not cause the concern
about the so-called death spiral.77
The concern EEI has is greater than a spending shift between
capital assets. It is, as it relates to distributed generation (“DG”), that
“current retail rate designs allow DG customers to avoid their fair share
of the fixed network costs, effectively shifting these costs to non-DG
customers through higher rates.”78 In other words, given EEI’s view that
there is “potential for widespread DER adoption” EEI is concerned that
utilities will lose not only sales, but eventually customers.79 Their fear is
that as more customers adopt solar and other technologies that reduce
or eliminate their reliance on the utility, this “in turn, may cause rates
to rise and improve the cost effectiveness of DG which causes more to
adopt and absent rate reform, could lead to unsustainable economic
conditions.”80 It is also true that third-party providers account for a
significant portion of solar installations, making capital investments on
which utilities cannot earn a rate of return, and also changing the rela-
tionship between utilities and their customers.81
74 Renewable generation capacity expected to account for most 2016 capacity additions,
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Jan. 10, 2017), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php
?id=29492 [https://perma.cc/YV8L-8UTP].
75 See Karl McDermott, Cost of Service Regulation in the Investor-Owned Electric Utility
Industry: A History of Adaptation, EDISON ELECTRIC INST. at 8–9 (2012), http://www.eei
.org/issuesandpolicy/stateregulation/documents/cosr_history_final.pdf [https://perma.cc
/D6AN-NLL8].
76 Future of Retail Rate Design, supra note 1, at 2, 9.
77 Id. at 5–6.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 2, 8. “DER” refers to distributed energy resources.
80 Id. at 7. See also David Roberts, Utilities Fighting Against Rooftop Solar are Only Has-
tening Their Own Doom, VOX (July 7, 2017), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environ
ment/2017/7/7/15927250/utilities-rooftop-solar-batteries [https://perma.cc/8GG5-87UK]
(arguing that solar combined with battery storage represents a major threat to utilities
due to economic opportunities for customers to partly or fully disconnect from the grid
in the next decade).
81 See About 30% of distributed solar capacity is owned by third parties, ENERGY INFO.
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EEI compares their situation to that of the death spiral in the
landline telephone industry, and compares the disruption of wireless
phones to distributed resources in the energy space today.82 EEI strug-
gles to acknowledge or quantify any value to the utility or ratepayers
from third-party or customer investment in distributed resources except
the energy value; it proposes that rooftop solar, for example, has little or
no value in mitigating the need for utility distribution and transmission
investment.83 That is an incomplete picture at best, as studies of the
value of solar/distributed generation in Vermont, Nevada, Mississippi,
Minnesota, and Maine have found it can have a benefit in reducing peak
demands and related infrastructure needs, offering positive cost-benefit
outcomes in many scenarios.84
Some utilities’ solution to the disruption is to fight it, by attempt-
ing to impose new fixed-cost based charges to net metering customers
(under the guise of rate reform) that make solar economics less attractive
and stall the momentum toward distributed generation.85 This rearguard
action has played out differently across the country, with utilities in
Arizona pressing (partly successfully) for changes to rates for solar
customers, and utilities in Nevada temporarily succeeding in imposing
punitive charges that “all but crushed the rooftop solar industry in
northern Nevada.”86 In Florida, utilities failed in pushing a ballot initia-
tive to raise fees on solar customers and create a monopoly to keep out
third-party solar providers.87 Many state regulators continue to fine tune
ADMIN. (Dec. 7, 2016), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=29052 [https://
perma.cc/ZR5S-H5EL].
82 Future of Retail Rate Design, supra note 1, at 8.
83 See id. at 6 (finding distribution system costs potentially increase due to distributed
generation resources, without a corresponding value for its potential to decrease infra-
structure needs through peak reduction, for example).
84 See Mark Muro & Devashree Saha, Rooftop solar: Net metering is a net benefit, THE
BROOKINGS INST. (May 23, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/rooftop-solar-net
-metering-is-a-net-benefit/ [https://perma.cc/9YGF-W5DS].
85 See id. (noting utilities have “sought to persuade state regulators to roll back net-
metering provisions”); Future of Retail Rate Design, supra note 1, at 7–9 (suggesting new
rate structures including new grid access fees).
86 Julia Pyper, Arizona Vote Puts an End to Net Metering for Solar Customers, GREEN-
TECH MEDIA (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Arizona-Vote
-Puts-an-End-to-Net-Metering-for-Solar-Customers [https://perma.cc/2Z7B-C5MS]; Julia
Pyper, Nevada Regulators Restore Retail-Rate Net Metering in Sierra Pacific Territory,
GREENTECH MEDIA (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/ne
vada-regulators-retore-retail-rate-net-metering-in-sierra-pacific-territo [https://perma.cc
/HSR4-S8E4].
87 Mary Ellen Klas, Florida voters say no to misleading solar amendment, MIAMI HERALD
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and tweak rate formulas seeking to achieve equity for all ratepayers
while keeping solar accessible to net metering customers.88
Acknowledging EEI’s comparison with landline phones and wire-
less, it is suggested that if the landline phone business had kept wireless
under its wing (and regulatory model), the landline phone companies
would not be struggling with stranded costs and declining revenues for
their product.89 This Article will not seek to further examine how or
whether utilities should adopt this line of thinking as it relates to distrib-
uted generation.90 Rather, this Article stipulates that distributed genera-
tion will likely continue to become more popular among consumers and
will likely continue to spur the rate questions and death spiral concerns
EEI raises. This Article now turns to the question of how utilities could
better address these concerns in a way that benefits ratepayers and re-
duces emissions, instead of fighting rearguard actions.
III. A NEW PURPOSE FOR UTILITY REGULATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY
A. The Opportunity
The challenges utilities face in the 21st Century are twofold:
relatively flat sales projections coupled with the revenue erosion from
increasing customer-sited solar, and increasing pressure for utilities to
play a significant role in greenhouse gas emissions reductions. However,
there is a solution to both challenges through a new opportunity: strate-
gic electrification of the heating and transportation sectors.
(Nov. 8, 2016, 8:39 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/election
/article113449438.html [https://perma.cc/85YZ-FFLR].
88 See Public Utilities Commission Amendments to Net Energy Billing Rule (Chapter 313),
Order Adopting Rule and Statement of Factual and Policy Basis, No. 2016-00222, Order
(Me. P.U.C. Mar. 1, 2017) (changing gradually over time the amount of transmission and
distribution cost a customer can offset through net metering while grandfathering in
existing customers for fifteen years).
89 Future of Retail Rate Design, supra note 1, at 8.
90 There are some utilities that seek to promote solar and do what EEI suggests in a
sense, by offering their own solar products. See, e.g., Julia Pyper, Georgia Power’s Rooftop
Solar Program Signs up Only 5 Customers, GREENTECH MEDIA (June 17, 2016), https://
www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Georgia-Powers-Rooftop-Solar-Program-Signs
-Up-Only-Five-Customers [https://perma.cc/WHC2-SAG6]. In addition, while this Article
focuses extensively on EEI’s position representing investor-owned utilities, it should be
noted that while they may not have exactly the same concerns, public power utilities are
also grappling with the changes in the industry. See Paul Ciampoli & Jessica Porter, The
Future by Design, PUBLICPOWER (May 1, 2017), http://www.publicpower.org/Media/maga
zine/ArticleDetail.cfm?ItemNumber=48022 [https://perma.cc/5GTT-57PW].
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Strategic electrification of the heating and transportation sectors
would bring utilities full circle in a sense, because electricity has been used
in automobiles since the late 1800s, and the all-electric home featuring
conventional electric heat was marketed heavily in the 1950s and 1960s.91
However, natural gas and other fossil fuels are now the dominant
source of space heating for homes.92 Likewise, the gasoline-powered
automobile out-competed the electric vehicle in the early 20th Century,
thanks in part to the cheap price of the Model T.93 In fact the oil industry
and automobile coalition helped push for federal highway funding so
consumers could use their products instead of competitors such as trol-
leys and rail.94 There was even a successful though ineffective federal
antitrust action against National City Lines, a company that bought up
local street car and trolley systems around the country and converted
them to bus systems, funded by automakers, oil companies, and tire
manufacturers who stood to gain from the conversions.95
Today, that dominance of fossil fuel for transportation and heating
has begun to change.96 New technologies have reinvigorated the electric
transportation and heating markets.97 Cold-climate and other heat pumps
can offer significant greenhouse gas emissions reductions and consumer
savings over fossil fuel heating, and electric and plug-in vehicles in states
with clean power grids offer the same.98 Progress is coming quickly in
91 The History of the Electric Car, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (Sept. 15, 2014), https://energy
.gov/articles/history-electric-car [https://perma.cc/BPW8-WGMU]; Diane Wedner, The All-
Consuming Bills of an All-Electric Home, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2001), http://articles.la
times.com/2001/aug/13/news/mn-33663 [https://perma.cc/7PLM-TQGQ].
92 See Everywhere but Northeast, fewer homes choose natural gas as heating fuel, ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 25, 2014), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=18131
[https://perma.cc/U4KD-37KN] (stating “[o]n a national basis, natural gas has long been
the dominant choice for primary heating fuel in the residential sector”).
93 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 91.
94 DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY & POWER 553 (1990).
95 Brian N. Briglin, The Streetcar Dilemma: Preventing Incurable Harm Through Timely
Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 38, 44–51 (2013), http://www.rut
gerslawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/archive/commentaries/2013/Biglin_Streetcar
Dilemma.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6CV-RANC].
96 See Fossil fuels still dominate U.S. energy consumption despite recent market share
decline, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 1, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/de
tail.php?id=26912 [https://perma.cc/YSC7-ZE4A].
97 See Bosco Astarloa et al., The Future of Electricity: New Technologies Transforming the
Grid Edge, WORLD ECON. FORUM 1,6–8 (Mar. 2017), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF
_Future_of_Electricity_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/4G4M-ZMPA].
98 See Steve Nadel, Should we promote heat pumps to save energy and reduce greenhouse
gas emissions?, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON. (May 4, 2016, 10:00 AM),
http://aceee.org/blog/2016/05/should-we-promote-heat-pumps-save [https://perma.cc/U3
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some places. In Norway today over 42% of new cars sold are plug-in
electric, and Norway, India, Britain, and France have all announced phase
outs of fossil fuel vehicle sales between 2025 and 2040.99 Navigant projects
more than 37 million electric vehicles to be in use globally by 2025.100
A new report from the Brattle Group lays out the full case for
strategic electrification that takes advantage of these new technologies
and trends. It notes that the U.S. Energy Information Administration
estimates net electric sales annual growth rates of 0.6% through 2040,
and that could easily decline further depending on the increase in solar
and other disruptive technologies.101 The report provides analysis of a
KF-9PPX]; DON ANAIR & AMINE MAHMASSANI, STATE OF CHARGE: ELECTRIC VEHICLES’
GLOBAL WARMING EMISSIONS AND FUEL-COST SAVINGS ACROSS THE UNITED STATES,
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (2012), http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy
/assets/documents/clean_vehicles/electric-car-global-warming-emissions-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RFS6-4C34] (finding that regardless of which state an electric vehicle
is charged in, it offers some greenhouse gas emission reduction benefit compared to an
average internal combustion engine vehicle, although finding most efficient conventional
vehicles best electric vehicles charged in coal-dependent regions); Jack Newsham, As
electricity costs rise, markets for heat pumps takes off, BOSTON GLOBE (Oct. 6, 2014),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/10/05/new-heat-pump-technology-can-warm
-homes-even-cold-new-england-winters/JgABf7wNFqRcYI6YVN6nsI/story.html [https://
web.archive.org/web/20170312041602/http://www.bostonglobe.com:80/business/2014/10
/05/new-heat-pump-technology-can-warm-homes-even-cold-new-england-winters/JgA
Bf7wNFqRcYI6YVN6nsI/story.html].
99 Stephen Castle, Britain to Ban New Diesel and Gas Cars by 2040, N.Y. TIMES (July 26,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/26/world/europe/uk-diesel-petrol-emissions.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/20170915063239/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/26/world
/europe/uk-diesel-petrol-emissions.html]; Fred Lambert, Electric cars reach record 42%
of Norway’s total new car sales with boost from Tesla Model X, ELECTREK (July 4, 2017,
7:34 AM), https://electrek.co/2017/07/04/electric-car-norway-tesla-model-x/ [https://perma
.cc/82KB-Z68C]. China has also recently announced plans to end the sale of fossil fuel
vehicles at an undetermined date in the future. See David Roberts, The world’s largest
car market just announced an imminent end to gas and diesel cars, VOX (Sep. 3, 2017),
https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2017/9/13/16293258/ev-revolution
[https://perma.cc/D23B-ZR2W]. One indication of how seriously the fossil fuel industry
takes the threat of electric vehicles and their potential to gain market share is that fossil
fuel industry-backed organizations are now explicitly targeting electric vehicles in nega-
tive advertisements. See Samantha Page, A Koch front group is putting out misleading
attack ads on electric vehicles, THINKPROGRESS (July 28, 2017, 4:38 PM), https://think
progress.org/fueling-us-backward-f50bc6ea4dd2 [https://perma.cc/Z2KA-JDGS].
100 See Scott Shepard & Sam Abuelsamid, Executive Summary: Market Data: Electric
Vehicle Market Forecasts, NAVIGANT RESEARCH at 3 (2016), https://www.navigantresearch
.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/EVMF-4Q13-Executive-Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc
/4DB6-NLCT].
101 Jurgen Weiss et al., Electrification: Emerging Opportunities for Utility Growth, THE
BRATTLE GROUP at 7 (2017), http://www.brattle.com/system/news/pdfs/000/001/174/original
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scenario involving a greater utility sector effort to provide a clean electric
supply, and then leverage that supply with greater sales through strategic
electrification of transportation and heating (such as by plug-in vehicles
and heat pumps).102
Brattle Group analysis shows that a massive effort to electrify the
heating and transportation sectors, coupled with a 100% electric power
supply, could reduce greenhouse gas emissions by more than 70% com-
pared to 2015 levels, putting the U.S. on a path to meet 2050 emission
reduction goals with complementary efforts.103 This level of strategic
electrification would increase electricity demand by 3,560 terawatt-hours
in 2050, producing a 75% increase in electric sales in 2050 relative to the
base case.104 Achieving, or even getting directionally close to the results
laid out in the report would clearly allow utilities to play an integral role
in emission reduction and address the concern about revenue and sales
erosion from distributed resources.
Achieving this type of scenario would be a major undertaking,
with many attendant challenges, and the Brattle Group points out “full
or even significant electrification of the transport and heating systems
is far from a foregone conclusion.”105 They cite competition from conven-
tional fuel interests, and note “[t]he positive outlook outlined in this
Paper is not likely to occur without utilities playing a leading role to set
the path forward in modernizing and decarbonizing sectors in which it
has not traditionally been involved, including deploying assets and
providing access to electric power infrastructure.”106 Among the factors
Brattle Group cites for success are regulatory outreach, rate reform,
adoption of financial incentives, pilot projects, and deployment of new
charging infrastructure.107
B. Current Utility Regulation Ill-Suited to the Opportunity
Despite the clear greenhouse gas emission benefits and clear ca-
pacity for strategic electrification of the heating and transportation sectors
/Electrification_Whitepaper_Final_Single_Pages.pdf?1485532518 [https://perma.cc/3T
KW-686T].
102 Id. at 15–17.
103 Id. at 1, 8.
104 Id. at 6–7.
105 Id. at 13.
106 Id. at 15.
107 Weiss et al., supra note 101, at 15.
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to counter the death spiral and spur new sales for electric utilities, the
transformation the Brattle Group report envisions is not yet widely under-
way. Further, electric utility regulation as currently envisioned may be
ill-suited to the task of moving utilities in this direction.
For example, when a utility does take the initiative to realize the
vision in the Brattle Group report and push for strategic electrification,
it can still be told by the regulator, such as in the case of Kansas City
Power & Light, that these types of investments are not going to be al-
lowed in rates.108
Kansas City Power & Light, an investor-owned utility in the Mid-
west, sought to invest $20 million to install 1000 electric vehicle charging
stations, to interest its more than 800,000 customers in using electricity
to fuel their transportation needs.109 The utility planned this to sell more
electricity at off-peak times, which would improve the load factor of its
grid (recalling Insull’s insight about factories able to run a second or
third shift with the same capital infrastructure to increase productivity)
and allow per-unit costs to come down—lowering rates for all utility
customers.110 This proposal would be a win for the environment by moving
to cleaner electric transportation (the area grid is powered roughly half
by renewables and nuclear), a win for all utility customers in the form of
a more efficient grid and lower rates, and a win for the utility and its
investors as a means of countering the revenue death spiral and continu-
ing to be relevant to its customers.111 The upshot: regulators refused to
allow the utility to rate base this investment, saying the utility failed to
prove a need for the charging stations or to prove why the utility should
take the lead on installing them.112
In its decision, the State Corporation Commission of the State of
Kansas found several concerns with the proposal by Kansas City Power
& Light. They were concerned about cross-subsidization whereby one
class of customers shoulders costs for the benefit of another class.113 The
108 Robert Siegel & Andrea Hsu, In America’s Heartland, A Power Company Leads Charge
For Electric Cars, NPR (Feb. 14, 2017, 4:42 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechcon
sidered/2017/02/14/514517425/in-americas-heartland-a-power-company-leads-charge-for
-electric-cars [https://perma.cc/NRB3-6CTR].
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Order Denying KCP&L’s Application for Approval of its Clean Charge Network Project
and Electric Vehicle Charging Tariff at 14–15, In the Matter of Kansas City Power &
Light’s Application to Deploy and Operate its Proposed Clean Charge Network (2016)
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Commission found customer demand speculative, was concerned charg-
ing stations would be obsolete before their intended lifespan was com-
plete, and that customers who did charge would prefer to do so at
home.114 It found the private sector in the form of landlords and private
businesses were a better fit to install charging stations than the utility.115
Ultimately, the Commission concluded that while electric vehicle deploy-
ment is “a laudable goal,” it was not within the utility’s scope of service
and that “[p]romoting EV ownership and usage is better left to the
automobile industry.”116
While some in the auto industry are moving aggressively toward
electrification strategies, the industry as a whole is still actively opposing
federal fuel efficiency and emissions standards that have helped jump-
start electric vehicle deployment.117
Complementing the point made by the rejection of the Kansas
City Power & Light example, a proposal by Ameren Missouri to install
electric charging stations in its service territory in Missouri, caused the
Public Service Commission there to find that such charging stations were
not appropriately in their regulatory jurisdiction, and therefore to reject
their inclusion in the utility rate-base.118
(No. 16-KCPE-160-MIS), http://estar.kcc.ks.gov/estar/ViewFile.aspx/20160913110134.pdf
?Id=4b0556f3-425d-4469-8eb1-a105109511ec [https://perma.cc/ABY7-G2X2] [hereinafter
Kansas City Power]. This concern has been raised in the context of solar net metering as
well, although as some commentators point out, cross-subsidization occurs in many con-
texts, see, e.g., William Pentland, Why the net metering fight is a red herring for utilities,
UTILITY DIVE (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/why-the-net-metering
-fight-is-a-red-herring-for-utilities/307061/ [https://perma.cc/XG7B-W7ND].
114 Kansas City Power, supra note 113, at 12–14.
115 Id. at 8.
116 Id. at 7.
117 See Neal E. Boudette, Automakers Call on E.P.A. Chief to Ease Fuel-Efficiency Stan-
dards, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/22/business/energy
-environment/automakers-pruitt-mileage-rules.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20170
329101610/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/22/business/energy-environment/auto
makers-pruitt-mileage-rules.html]; Alex Davies, How GM Beat Tesla to the First True
Mass-Market Electric Car, WIRED (Feb. 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/01/gm-elec
tric-car-chevy-bolt-mary-barra/ [https://perma.cc/B3VX-GE9V]; Jack Ewing, Volvo, Betting
on Electric, Moves to Phase Out Conventional Engines, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/business/energy-environment/volvo-hybrid-electric-car
.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20170915044214/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05
/business/energy-environment/volvo-hybrid-electric-car.html].
118 Report and Order at 12, In the Matter of the Application of Union Electric Company
d/b/a Ameren Missouri for Approval of a Tariff Setting a Rate for Electric Vehicle
Charging Stations (File No. ET-2016-0246) (before the Pub. Serv. Comm’n of the State
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As the Brattle Group report makes clear, policy and regulatory
reform are essential to help the transformation take place and to seize
the opportunity for utility leadership.119 Would Kansas and Missouri regu-
lators have made a different decision, or at least had different consider-
ations, if Kansas and Missouri utilities were operating under a law similar
to Vermont’s Renewable Energy Standard? That law offers an example
of what such reforms could look like.
C. The Vermont Renewable Energy Standard
1. Context for Change
Vermont’s initial foray into renewable energy development policy
looked different than many states that had adopted renewable portfolio
standards (which typically require ownership and retention of a certain
quantity of renewable energy certificates demonstrating a percentage of
supply is met with qualifying renewable energy).120 In Vermont, under
a law passed in 2005, utilities were required to have a collective percentage
of Sustainably Priced Energy Enterprise Development (“SPEED”) re-
sources.121 This promoted the construction of in-state renewable energy
projects, and helped provide support for them through long-term utility
contracts with the SPEED resource target of 20% of the state’s total elec-
tric sales by 2017.122 However, as part of the program, Vermont utilities
were able to sell renewable energy certificates (“RECs”) associated with the
generation.123 All other New England states had moved to a renewable
portfolio standard (“RPS”) approach that required ownership/retention
of RECs to meet state goals and targets.124 The Vermont Public Service
Board (now called the Vermont Public Utility Commission) was directed
of Mo.) (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.efis.psc.mo.gov/mpsc/commoncomponents/view_item
no_details.asp?caseno=ET-2016-0246&attach_id=2017016053 [https://web.archive.org
/save/https://www.efis.psc.mo.gov/mpsc/commoncomponents/view_itemno_details.asp
?caseno=ET-2016-0246&attach_id=2017016053].
119 Weiss et al., supra note 101, at 15.
120 See Jan Hamrin, REC Definitions and Tracking Mechanisms Used by State RPS
Programs, CLEAN ENERGY STATES ALL. (2014), http://www.cesa.org/assets/2014-Files
/RECs-Attribute-Definitions-Hamrin-June-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ATQ-EQ49].
121 2005 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 61.
122 See VT. PUB. SERV. BOARD, BIENNIAL REPORT TO THE VERMONT GENERAL ASSEMBLY
PURSUANT TO 30 V.S.A. § 8004(F), at 2 (2014), http://www.leg.state.vt.us/reports/2014Ex
ternalReports/300575.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KQ5-UKDJ].
123 Id. at 4.
124 Id.
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by the Vermont Legislature to issue a study in 2011 examining whether
to continue with an updated SPEED program (initial program goals were
set for 2012 and met by Vermont utilities) or an RPS for Vermont.125 The
Board recommended an RPS that would result in 75% of total electric load
being met with renewable electricity (with REC ownership/retention simi-
lar to the other five New England states) by 2033.126 The Board critiqued
the SPEED program in terms of how much environmental and emission
reduction benefit it offered.127 In 2012 the Vermont Legislature took up
various proposals looking at an RPS, with debate over the appropriate
goal and REC ownership/retention.128 Tied in with that discussion was
the future of the Vermont Standard Offer Program, a renewable procure-
ment program for smaller-scale projects 2.2 megawatts or less in size.129
Ultimately an RPS did not pass in Vermont in 2012, and instead
legislation updating the SPEED and Standard Offer programs did.130
The RPS discussion in Vermont was effectively tabled until net
metering legislation was moving through the legislature in 2014. As a
part of that bill, another study was required on whether to move to an
RPS, this time by the Public Service Department (a part of the executive
branch) as opposed to the Public Service Board (an independent quasi-
judicial body).131 In the summer of 2014, new legislation in Connecticut,
one of the markets where Vermont utilities sell RECs, called into question
whether Vermont’s SPEED program constituted double-counting of envi-
ronmental attributes.132 Connecticut Public Act 303 (2013) stated that:
[O]n and after January 1, 2014, any megawatt hours of
electricity from a renewable energy source described un-
der this subparagraph that are claimed or counted by a
125 See VT. PUB. SERV. BOARD, STUDY ON RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY REQUIREMENTS at 3–4
(2011), http://www.leg.state.vt.us/reports/2011ExternalReports/271962.pdf [https://perma
.cc/C93W-EDKC] [hereinafter RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY REQUIREMENTS].
126 Id. at 32.
127 Id. at 9.
128 See Alan Panebaker, Administration produces renewable portfolio standard proposal,
VTDIGGER (Mar. 1, 2012, 7:21 PM), https://vtdigger.org/2012/03/01/administration-produces
-renewable-portfolio-standard-proposal/#.WZ3t2zOZM0o [https://perma.cc/A4VM-U4SV].
129 Id.
130 2012 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 170, available at http://legislature.vermont.gov/assets
/Documents/2012/Docs/ACTS/ACT170/ACT170%20As%20Enacted.pdf [https://perma.cc
/7PYV-AA4E].
131 2014 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 99, § 9(b), available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/DOCS
/2014/ACTS/ACT099.PDF [https://perma.cc/NRM8-LYFV].
132 2013 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 303 (amending Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16-1(a)(20)).
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load-serving entity, province or state toward compliance
with renewable portfolio standards or renewable energy
policy goals in another province or state, other than the
State of Connecticut, shall not be eligible for compliance
with the renewable portfolio standards established pursu-
ant to section 16-245a, as amended by this act.133
Vermont’s SPEED goal was a retail sales goal not an REC reten-
tion program, but the Connecticut law called into question whether
Vermont RECs would nonetheless be ineligible for compliance in Con-
necticut, leading NextEra Energy to state it would no longer trade
Vermont RECs due to the uncertainty.134 The report called for in Act 99
in Vermont in 2014, was completed by the Public Service Department in
December of 2014.135 It followed Public Service Board studies on the
same subject in 2011 and 2013, and it rejected the approach of simply re-
quiring all SPEED project RECs to be retained, rather than traded, as not
being cost-effective for Vermont.136 However, the Department report did
propose a transition from SPEED to a new renewable energy policy that
was more in-line with other states and could drive energy innovation.137
Specifically, the report recognized that “roughly half of Vermont green-
house gas emissions are due to transportation, and approximately another
1/3 are due to fuels used for heat and industrial process.”138 The report
called not only for a renewable energy policy for electricity supply, but
also for such a policy to “facilitate action to increase use of renewables
and lower greenhouse gas emissions in other sectors,” and to “encourage
development and deployment of innovative energy technologies that reduce
our dependence on fossil fuels.”139
At the time (and still today) that approach is fairly unique for
considering incorporating policies into an RPS that include the heating
and transportation sectors, although some states such as Massachusetts
133 Id.
134 See John Herrick, Electricity Supplier won’t buy Vermont renewable energy credits,
VTDIGGER (May 19, 2014), https://vtdigger.org/2014/05/19/electricity-supplier-wont-buy
-vermont-renewable-energy-credits/#.WZ37JDOZM0o [https://perma.cc/VJJ4-GCYW].
135 See VT. PUB. SERV. DEP’T, REPORT TO THE VERMONT LEGISLATURE ON SPEED AND RE-
NEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS at 1 (2014), http://www.revermont.org/wp-content/uploads
/PSD-RPS-study-12.15.2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/JV3W-Z8HH].
136 Id. at 2.
137 Id. at 4.
138 Id.
139 Id.
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and New Hampshire had recognized renewable thermal technologies as
being allowed to count towards compliance.140
As a final note on the context for consideration of the 2015 Ver-
mont RPS, the rate impacts of such a policy changed greatly due to the
uncertainty around Connecticut’s double-counting legislation. In the
Public Service Board’s 2011 report, the cost estimate to implement a new
RPS (which would necessarily require foregoing some REC sales that
were contributing to utility revenue and instead retain a quantity of
RECs for compliance) ranged from a 1% cost increase to a 16% cost in-
crease compared to business as usual.141 In 2014, however, the potential
rate impact of doing nothing and seeing an adverse impact in the REC
markets was projected at a 6% rate hike statewide, and up to 20% for
some utilities depending on how much of their revenue was derived from
REC sales under the SPEED program.142
Analysis of the initial proposal from the Public Service Depart-
ment showed a proposed 2015 RPS bill would instead have a rate impact
of 1% initially, rising to just under 4% by 2032, lower than the policy risk
of losing access to REC markets.143 However, by further expanding the
reach of the policy to include a major strategic electrification component
with cold-climate heat pumps and electric vehicles, the rate impact of the
140 See Alternative Energy Portfolio Standard, DSIRE N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECHNOLOGY
CENTER (Dec. 1, 2015), http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/4624 [https://
perma.cc/55YN-PZ8A]; Renewable Portfolio Standard, DSIRE NC CLEAN ENERGY TECH-
NOLOGY CENTER (Mar. 28, 2017), http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail
/2523 [https://perma.cc/GEL4-9AAT].
141 See RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY REQUIREMENTS, supra note 125, at 13.
142 Memorandum from Darren Springer, Deputy Commissioner, Vermont Public Service
Department, to Members of the Vermont House Committee on Natural Resources and
Energy (Feb. 9, 2015), http://legislature.vermont.gov/assets/Documents/2016/WorkGroups
/House%20Ways%20and%20Means/Bills/H.40/H.40~Darren%20Springer~SPEED%20
Program-%20H.40%20Briefing%20Paper~2-20-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Y8F-5SUV];
H 40 Renewable Energy Standard and Energy Transformation (RESET), Hearing Before
the H. Comm. On Nat. Res. and Energy, 2015–2016 Sess. (Vt. 2015) (statement of Patty
Richards, Washington Electric Cooperative), http://legislature.vermont.gov/assets/Docu
ments/2016/WorkGroups/House%20Natural%20Resources/Bills/H.40/Witness%20Testi
mony/H.40~Patty%20Richards~Washington%20Electric%20Cooperative,%20H.40%20
Renewable%20Energy%20Standard%20and%20Energy%20Transformation%20(RESET)
~1-29-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EQX-E94P].
143 See Energy Innovation Program, Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Nat. Res. and En-
ergy, 2015–2016 Sess. (Vt. 2015) (statement of Darren Springer, Vermont Public Service
Department), http://legislature.vermont.gov/assets/Documents/2016/WorkGroups/House
%20Natural%20Resources/Bills/H.40/Witness%20Testimony/H.40~Darren%20Springer
~Energy%20Innovation%20Program~1-23-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/E96N-WR53].
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entire policy fell to a 0.4% initial impact, decreasing to a negative 0.6 %
impact by 2032.144 This projection is made possible again by referring
back to Insull’s factory running a third shift to increase productivity of
an existing capital asset.145 In other words, the Vermont policy of increas-
ing electric use primarily during cheap off-peak hours for heat pumps
and electric vehicles, would allow more units of electricity to be sold with-
out dramatically increasing capital expenses for the grid, thus lowering
the per unit rate for customers.146
2. The Vermont RES Design
Act 56 of 2015, an act relating to establishing a renewable energy
standard (Vermont RES) was signed into law in Vermont by Governor
Peter Shumlin on June 11, 2015.147
It had several interlinked components, including a repeal of the
SPEED program and its associated goals.148 By repealing the SPEED
program, the Vermont RES eliminated any concerns around double-
counting resources toward SPEED and also toward other state RPS
programs, thereby removing the near-term rate risk utilities would face
if they lost access to sell RECs in the New England market. In the midst
of consideration of the legislation that ultimately became the Vermont
RES, the Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (“PURA”)
issued a proposed declaratory ruling finding the 2017 SPEED goals could
raise a claim under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16-1(a)(20), but noted that no final
determination would be made at that time because Vermont had a
process underway to change the program via legislation.149 Weeks later
144 Id.
145 Cudahy & Henderson, supra note 14, at 39–41.
146 See H. 40 Q&A, Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Finance, 2015–2016 Sess. (Vt. 2015)
(statement of Darren Springer, Vermont Public Service Department), http://legisla
ture.vermont.gov/assets/Documents/2016/WorkGroups/Senate%20Finance/Bills/H.40/Wit
ness%20Testimony/W~Darren%20Springer~H.40%20Q%20and%20A~4-14-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LG89-PZKZ] [hereinafter H. 40 Q&A].
147 Dave Gram, Shumlin signs renewable energy bill, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS (June 11,
2015, 8:48 PM), http://www.burlingtonfreepress.com/story/news/local/2015/06/11/shumlin
-signs-renewable-energy-bill/71098150/ [https://perma.cc/GBV3-9XDL].
148 See 2015 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 56, available at http://legislature.vermont.gov/assets
/Documents/2016/Docs/ACTS/ACT056/ACT056%20As%20Enacted.pdf [https://perma.cc
/Q3FP-5HW8] (deleting all references to the SPEED program).
149 Proposed Final Decision at 11, Declaratory Ruling Regarding Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16-
1(a)(20), As Amended by PA 13-303, Concerning the Possible Double Counting of RECS
(No. 15-01-03) (Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority, Mar. 11, 2015), http://
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PURA issued a final decision confirming that “[p]roposed legislation in
Vermont, if enacted, would provide more certainty today that SPEED
2017 goals would be administered in a way that is entirely compatible
with other state RPS programs.”150
The Vermont RES also established what looks more or less like
a conventional RPS with a Tier I and Tier II.151 Tier I made the previ-
ously established goals of 55% renewable electricity in 2017, rising to
75% by 2032, a mandatory REC retention program.152 Tier I allowed all
renewable resources, old or new, large or small, to qualify provided they
were capable of delivery to the New England market.153 Tier II estab-
lished a subset goal (again with REC retention for compliance) that 1%
of all electricity in 2017, rising to 10% by 2032, would come from new five
megawatt or less distributed renewable generation.154 There were some
flexibilities built into Tier I and Tier II to accommodate utilities that were
already 100% Tier I renewable (Burlington Electric Department and
Washington Electric Cooperative).155
Finally (and for purposes here most importantly) the legislation
established a Tier III that required electric distribution utilities to meet
2% of retail sales equivalent in 2017 with “energy transformation” pro-
jects.156 That requirement would rise to 12% by 2032.157 Energy transfor-
mation projects are defined in the statute as measures that “shall result
in a net reduction in fossil fuel consumed by the provider’s customers and
in the emission of greenhouse gases attributable to that consumption,
whether or not the fuel is supplied by the provider.”158 Such projects are
required in the law to undergo some life-cycle environmental and economic
cost analysis.159 The annual requirement is determined by converting the
“net reduction in fossil fuel consumption resulting from the energy trans-
formation project to a MWH equivalent of electric energy,” using a formula
legislature.vermont.gov/assets/Documents/2016/WorkGroups/Senate%20Finance/Bills
/H.40/Witness%20Testimony/W~Darren%20Springer~Connecticut%20Ruling%20on
%20Renewable%20Energy%20Certificates~4-14-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/MB4B-YK6B].
150 Id.
151 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30 § 8005 (a)(1–2) (2017).
152 Id. § 8005 (a)(1).
153 Id. § 8005 (a)(1)(A).
154 Id. § 8005 (a)(2).
155 Id. § 8005 (b).
156 Id. (a)(3).
157 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30 § 8005 (a)(3).
158 Id. § 8005 (a)(3)(C)(ii).
159 Id. § 8005 (a)(3)(C)(iii).
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specified.160 It is in this requirement that Vermont law uniquely states
to its electric utilities that they must help their customers install technolo-
gies that reduce fossil fuel use in the heating and transportation sectors.
Tier III includes several additional unique features. While requir-
ing cost-effectiveness screening (similar to Vermont’s existing energy
efficiency programs), the law provided for “prior approval” of technology
categories as opposed to individual project by project review.161 The law
requires annual verification of provider claims regarding projects, but
changes to the Tier III credit value of a project category resulting from
such verification would be applied going forward, with no penalty retro-
actively that could punish a utility from meeting compliance through
good faith efforts.162 Tier III allows unlimited banking of credits for
compliance in future years.163 Tier III also has language seeking equita-
ble distribution of benefits among rate classes and ratepayers of various
income levels, and language intended to ensure best practices for de-
mand management where electrification technologies are used so as to
not exacerbate peak demands on the grid.164
Updated modeling from the Vermont Public Service Department
as the bill that became the Vermont RES progressed in the Senate
showed a range of net state savings from $150 million to $904 million,
depending largely on the price of oil.165 Those savings included projected
customer-side savings from participants who would under Tier III receive
some type of incentive or assistance to reduce their fossil fuel use, such
as purchasing an electric vehicle or weatherizing a home.166 Analysis
160 Id. § 8005 (a)(3)(D); see also A Sample Calculation of Net Fossil Fuel BTU Savings,
Converted to MWh, Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Natural Resources and Energy,
2015–2016 session (Vt. 2015) (statement of Asa Hopkins, Vermont Public Service Depart-
ment), http://legislature.vermont.gov/assets/Documents/2016/WorkGroups/House%20Nat
ural%20Resources/Bills/H.40/Witness%20Testimony/W~Asa%20Hopkins~A%20
sample%20calculation%20of%20net%20fossil%20fuel%20BTU%20savings,%20converted
%20to%20MWh~1-29-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/RNT9-7Q6R].
161 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30 § 8005 (a)(3)(F)(ii).
162 Id. § 8005 (a)(3)(F)(v).
163 Id. § 8005 (a)(3)(F)(iv) (2017).
164 Id. § 8005 (a)(3)(F)(vi–viii).
165 Memorandum from Asa Hopkins, Director of Energy Policy and Planning, Vermont
Public Service Department, to Members of the Vermont Senate Committee on Natural
Resources and Energy (Apr. 21, 2015), http://legislature.vermont.gov/assets/Documents
/2016/WorkGroups/Senate%20Natural%20Resources/Bills/H.40/Testimony/H.40~Depart
ment%20of%20Public%20Service~Memo%20Updating%20the%20PSD’s%20model%20
of%20H.40%20to%20incorporate%20the%202015%20Annual%20Energy%20Outlook%20
forecast%20of%20oil%20prices~4-22-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NXP-EZJ9].
166 Id. See also Energy Innovation Program, supra note 143.
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from the Department suggested Tier III could, over its lifetime, support
weatherization or the addition of cold-climate heat pumps in over 85,000
homes and businesses.167 As a whole, the law is projected by the Depart-
ment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in Vermont by 15 million tons
by 2032, enough to put the state on a path to achieving a quarter of its
2050 emissions goal.168 Independent analysis from the Legislature’s Joint
Fiscal Office found the legislation offered “significant net potential eco-
nomic and environmental benefits from the program, subject to fuel price
and other program performance assumptions.”169
To realize those projections, the program would have to be imple-
mented with care. The Vermont Public Service Board’s order in Docket
No. 8550 made a number of program decisions based on flexibility pro-
vided to the Board by the Vermont RES. In particular, related to Tier III,
the Board found measures would receive credit based on a prospective
review by an existing body, the Technical Advisory Group.170 The Board’s
decision on cost-effectiveness screening included a requirement that, con-
sistent with the Vermont RES, energy transformation projects must be
below the applicable alternative compliance cost and that utilities submit
annual plans for energy transformation projects.171 As the law provided,
utilities did not need to pursue electrification projects to meet Tier III;
biomass heating, weatherization, and many other measures qualify.172
However, clearly the projected ratepayer benefits depend on consider-
ation of strategic electrification projects that improve the load factor of
the grid, even though the law required special consideration of the
impacts of increased electric use (which makes sense after years of effort
to reduce electric demand through efficiency programs in Vermont).173
167 See Energy Innovation Program, supra note 143.
168 VT. PUB. SERV. DEP’T, COMPREHENSIVE ENERGY PLAN 2016, 12 (2016), https://outside
.vermont.gov/sov/webservices/Shared%20Documents/2016CEP_Final.pdf [https://perma
.cc/LX79-NEA2].
169 Memorandum from Tom Kavet and Aiden Davis, Legislative Joint Fiscal Office, to Steve
Klein, Legislative Joint Fiscal Office (Feb. 23, 2015), http://legislature.vermont.gov/assets
/Documents/2016/WorkGroups/Senate%20Natural%20Resources/Bills/H.40/Testimony/H.40
~Department%20of%20Public%20Service~H.40%20-%20Preliminary%20Economic
%20and%20Fiscal%20Review%20to%20Date~4-16-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/37YM-V7U9].
170 Order Implementing the Renewable Energy Standard at 20, Investigation re: Estab-
lishment of the Renewable Energy Standard Program, Vt. Pub. Serv. Board (No. 8550)
(June 28, 2016), http://psb.vermont.gov/sites/psbnew/files/doc_library/8550-final-order.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ST75-MD9G].
171 Id. at 24–25.
172 Id. at 2, 45.
173 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30 § 8005 (a)(3)(F)(viii).
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Initial utility plans for meeting Tier III are now underway for the
first compliance year in 2017. Vermont utilities are offering programs for
installation of cold-climate heat pumps, heat pump hot water heaters,
whole home efficiency retrofits (including some programs specifically
designed for low-income customers), electric vehicle incentives and
electric charging stations, electric bus deployment, and discounted line
extensions and service upgrades for customers (including maple syrup
producers) using fossil fuel generators.174 Notably, the utilities in Ver-
mont that all filed Tier III plans, whether investor-owned (Green Moun-
tain Power) or municipal (Burlington Electric Department) or cooperative
(Vermont Electric Cooperative and Washington Electric Cooperative), all
featured major strategic electrification components to displace fossil fuel
use.175 As an example of the potential of Tier III to achieve some of the
aims laid out in the Brattle Group report, Burlington Electric Depart-
ment estimates that its programs to reduce fossil fuel use in the heating
and transportation sectors through strategic electrification could increase
energy sales by 9.6% (compared to base case) over the next two decades,
while limiting the impact on peak demand and increasing load factor
from 60% to 65%.176
D. Other Examples of Utility-Led Energy Transformation
While the Vermont RES may be one of the most comprehensive
policies pushing utilities toward leading the energy transformation and
realizing the economic and environmental benefits outlined in the Brat-
tle Group report, there are other promising examples of reforms around
the nation.
174 GREEN MOUNTAIN POWER, 2017 RENEWABLE ENERGY STANDARD TIER III ANNUAL PLAN
(2017), http://www.neep.org/sites/default/files/resources/GMP%20Tier%20III%20Annual
%20Plan%20(2017).pdf [https://perma.cc/L8MD-WRUP]; CITY OF BURLINGTON ELECTRIC
DEP’T, 2017 ANNUAL ENERGY TRANSFORMATION PROGRAM PLAN (2016), http://www.neep
.org/sites/default/files/resources/BED%20Tier%20III%20plan_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc
/XET4-ZWXC]; VT. ELEC. COOP., 2017 TIER III PLAN (2016), http://www.neep.org/sites/de
fault/files/resources/VEC%202017%20Tier%20III%20Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/V65B
-JCB5]; Wash. Elec. Coop., Act 56, and WEC’s ‘Energy Transformation’ Plan for 2017,
WEC CO-OP CURRENTS (Dec. 2016), http://www.washingtonelectric.coop/wp-content/up
loads/2016/01/Dec2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/JUD5-JH27] [hereinafter Tier III Plans].
175 Id.
176 2016 INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN at 9, CITY OF BURLINGTON ELEC. DEP’T (2017),
https://www.burlingtonelectric.com/sites/default/files/inline-files/0.%20Executive%20
Summary_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7RD-5JXV]. Load factor is a measure of the
efficiency of a utility’s use of the grid comparing average load to peak load. Id.
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In 2015, Washington enacted HB 1853 into law, which made clear
that utilities could rate-base their investments in electric charging sta-
tions similar to the way they would rate-base a power plant or transmis-
sion line, and receive an incentive rate of return for electric charging
station investments.177 As reported by Greentech Media, John Gartner
of Navigant Research said the following in relation to the passage of the
Washington legislation:
Utilities have a vested interest in the operation of EV
charging stations as they can increase revenue, and when
smartly managed, complement rather than complicate
grid operations. State regulators are slowly catching on
that for vehicle electrification to have its intended benefit
of emissions reductions, utilities should be permitted and
encourage[d] to play a central role.178
California reversed course, after initially barring utilities from
building electric charging infrastructure over market impact concerns,
and saw an initial proposal to spend over $1 billion on over 60,000 charg-
ing stations from three large utilities.179 Those proposals were pared
down significantly, but ultimately utilities in California received approval
to spend tens of millions of dollars on thousands of charging stations.180
In Michigan, however, an initial proposal by Consumers Energy
to install 810 fast-charge stations for $15 million was criticized by regu-
lators and stakeholders, and ultimately withdrawn.181
The Michigan example as well as the earlier discussion of Kansas
Power and Light’s proposal and Missouri’s reluctance to assert regula-
tory jurisdiction over charging station infrastructure point to tensions in
177 WASH. REV. CODE § 80.28.360 (2016).
178 Julia Pyper, Utilities in Washington State Get the Green Light to Rate-Base EV Charg-
ing Stations, GREENTECH MEDIA (May 14, 2015), https://www.greentechmedia.com/arti
cles/read/utilities-in-washington-state-get-the-green-light-to-rate-base-ev-charging
[https://perma.cc/XD34-WPPN].
179 See id. See also Utility Involvement in Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure: Cali-
fornia at the Vanguard, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUDIES (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www
.csis.org/analysis/utility-involvement-electric-vehicle-charging-infrastructure-california
-vanguard [https://perma.cc/Y5D5-342N].
180 Id.
181 See Andy Balaskovitz, Michigan utility withdraws plans for electric vehicle charging
network, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (Feb. 17, 2017), http://midwestenergynews.com/2017/02
/17/michigan-utility-withdraws-plans-for-electric-vehicle-charging-network/ [https://perma
.cc/E4KH-E253].
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the regulatory environment. Should utilities be allowed to participate in
the electric vehicle infrastructure market and rate-base their invest-
ments, or should these initiatives be left to third parties?
These tensions were also raised in the Vermont RES, as well as
California’s regulatory proceedings around electric vehicle infrastructure
investments, but were resolved in favor of scoping an appropriate role for
utilities making investments, while seeking to protect independent third
parties offering similar products or services.182 The California Public
Utilities Commission (“CPUC”) set aside a previous requirement that
utilities demonstrate a market failure before being able to invest in this
infrastructure, in favor of a new balancing test allowing utilities to invest
with certain scrutiny (such as examining level of competitiveness in the
market and mitigating unfair advantages a utility would have).183
The Vermont RES provides clear opportunities for utilities to
pursue strategic electrification through incentives or programs autho-
rized by law, although Tier III incentives were intended to be treated
similar to power supply costs that are passed through in rates but not
treated as capital investments that earn a rate of return.184 However,
some Tier III investments, such as ownership of an electric vehicle
charging station or cold-climate heat pump, could be treated as a capital
investment that earns a rate of return.185 In Vermont, utility programs
directly offering products such as heat pumps or heat pump water heat-
ers to customers have been permitted in a pilot phase, but regulators
have not definitively weighed in on the role of the utility in this market
relative to third-party businesses.186
In another intriguing example of seeking to resolve the tension in
the role of third-party provider and utility, Eversource Energy in Massa-
chusetts proposed making a significant rate-based investment in what
182 See Phase 1 Decision Establishing Policy to Expand the Utilities’ Role in Development
of Electric Vehicle Infrastructure at 2, 3, Application of SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC
COMPANY (U902E) for Approval of its Electric Vehicle—Grid Integration Pilot Program
(Decision 14-12-079, Rulemaking 13-11-007) (Pub. Util. Comm’n of the State of Cal.,
Dec. 18, 2014), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M143/K682/14368
2372.PDF [https://perma.cc/B2TT-CQPZ] [hereinafter California PUC]; VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 30 § 8005 (a)(3)(E) (2017).
183 See California PUC, supra note 182, at 2, 8–9.
184 See H. 40 Q&A, supra note 146, at 4.
185 Id.
186 See, e.g., Procedural Order Closing Docket at *1–2, In re: Tariff filing of Green
Mountain Power Corporation requesting approval of innovative products tariff riders, to
take effect on a service-rendered basis September 4, 2016, 2017 WL 1373943 (No. 8794)
(Vt. Public Serv. Board, Feb. 9, 2017).
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it terms “make-ready” infrastructure for electric vehicles (such as the
distribution network and transformer and utility meter), while leaving
the actual vehicle charger investment and installation to third parties.187
It should be noted that while Vermont remains fully regulated,
with utility-led energy transformation proposals coming in states as
varied as California, Michigan, Massachusetts, Missouri, and Kansas, it
is clear that whether a state retains full utility regulation or some level
of deregulation (as California, Michigan, and Massachusetts do with
retail choice), there remains a viable business case for utilities to invest
in strategic electrification.188
E. The Game Change of Utility-Led Energy Transformation
1. Seizing the Opportunity
EEI, which raised the concerns about the utility death spiral,
recognizes the need for utility-led energy transformation. In a 2014 report,
it stated that “bringing electricity to the transportation sector is a huge,
albeit long-term opportunity for load growth.”189 It explicitly targets the
market share of the 93% of transportation that uses petroleum.190 It
further stated that “[l]eading the charge on electrification will help the
electric utility industry control its own destiny and meet future regula-
tions on its terms.”191 The report goes on to recognize that strategic
187 See Direct Testimony of Craig A. Hallstrom, Penelope M. Conner, Paul R. Renaud,
Jennifer A. Schilling, Samuel G. Eaton at 91, Petition of NSTAR Electric Company and
Western Massachusetts Electric Company each d/b/a Eversource Energy for Approval of
an Increase in Base Distribution Rates for Electric Service Pursuant to G.L. c. 164, § 94
and 220 C.M.R. § 5.00, D.P.U. 17-05 (Commonwealth of Mass. Dep’t of Pub. Util., Jan. 17,
2017), https://www.eversource.com/Content/docs/default-source/rates-tariffs/ma-2017-rate
-case--grid-modernization-base-commitment-testimony.pdf?sfvrsn=0 [https://perma.cc/9F
62-YEZ2] [hereinafter Eversource].
188 See Jonathan Oosting, Electric choice fuels Michigan energy overhaul fight, DETROIT
NEWS (May 16, 2016, 12:03 AM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2016/05
/16/electric-choice-fuels-michigan-energy-overhaul-fight/84423750/ [https://perma.cc/QG
3A-3GLF] (discussing retail choice programs in Michigan); Herman K. Trabish, CA bill
would let non-utilities sell electricity to commercial, industrial customers, UTILITYDIVE
(Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/ca-bill-would-let-non-utilities-sell-electric
ity-to-commercial-industrial/371421/ [https://perma.cc/C78P-GX7N] (discussing retail
choice in California).
189 Transportation Electrification: Utility Fleets Leading the Charge, EDISON ELEC. INST.
(June 2014), http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/electrictransportation/FleetVehicles/Docu
ments/EEI_UtilityFleetsLeadingTheCharge.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JH8-695S].
190 Id.
191 Id.
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electrification offers benefits for utilities, consumers, and the environ-
ment, and also cites data showing the utility is one of the consumers’
most trusted sources for information about electric vehicles.192 That said,
the report focuses primarily on utilities leading by example with their
own fleets, and is not fully focused on the larger opportunity in the trans-
portation and heating sectors for expansion of beneficial load.193 A 2015
EEI report does recognize more explicitly that electric vehicles offer
“beneficial load” that can put “downward pressure on rates,” and a 2017
EEI update shows $250 million in annual projects or programs to deploy
electric charging infrastructure by utilities, and another $128 million
towards supporting electric vehicles in utility fleets.194 That is certainly
a significant investment but not yet enough to tip the scales away from
petroleum, at a moment when for the first time in almost four decades
transportation greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. exceeded electric
power emissions.195
One only has to look backwards several years to 2009 to see what
a large difference an engaged utility sector could be when it comes to
changing the dynamics of climate and energy policy in the United States.
During the debate on a cap and trade bill in the U.S. Congress in 2009
and 2010, EEI was more focused on how to divide up emission allowances
among members based on their electric supply portfolios.196 The bill that
passed the House of Representatives contained only 3% of emission allow-
ances revenues to invest in electric vehicles for five years, then dropping
to 1% thereafter through 2025.197 Investments in coal power plant tech-
nology received a greater share than that, and the bulk of argument
among the utilities was how to distribute allowances among ratepayer
192 Id. at 4, 37.
193 Id. at 3–4.
194 Employee PEV Engagement Initiative, EDISON ELEC. INST. (2015), http://www.eei.org
/issuesandpolicy/electrictransportation/PEVengagement/Documents/employee_pev_en
gagement_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9V3-3P7T]; Delivering America’s Energy Future:
Electric Power Industry Outlook, EDISON ELEC. INST. (2017), http://www.eei.org/resources
andmedia/industrydataanalysis/industryfinancialanalysis/Documents/Wall_Street_Briefing
.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PD3-CT8W] [hereinafter Delivering America’s Energy Future].
195 Delivering America’s Energy Future, supra note 194, at 12.
196 See Darren Samuelsohn & Katherine Ling, ‘Fragile Compromise’ of Power Plant CEOs
in Doubt as Senate Debate Approaches, E&E NEWS (Aug. 5, 2009), http://www.eenews.net
/stories/81147 [https://perma.cc/R78C-RX62].
197 Comparison Chart: Plug-In Electric Vehicles in Climate-Energy Legislation for the
111th Congress, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOL. (2010), https://www.c2es.org/doc
Uploads/PEV_provisions_climate_energy_111th_legislation.pdf [https://perma.cc/EP4D
-5GB4].
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classes and geographic regions.198 Utilities did not appear to see the
climate bill as an opportunity to gain market share against fossil fuels
in the heating or transportation sectors. This reluctance to aggressively
seek to dominate new markets by utilities stands in stark contrast to the
behavior of similarly situated businesses in other industries. For example,
as previously mentioned, oil and auto companies systematically purchased
and dismantled electric streetcar systems in major cities in the 1930s
and 1940s, replacing them with bus service powered by petroleum.199
2. Five Principles for Regulation
Today in 2017, as has been documented, some utilities are start-
ing to seek to engage in various ways in energy transformation in new
sectors. What can be gleaned from early examples of regulation and legis-
lation to determine guiding principles?
A first proposed principle can be found in Vermont’s explicit pairing
between an RPS and an energy transformation program: Utility-led
energy transformation requires an increasingly clean electric supply to
enable greenhouse gas emission and air pollution reduction benefits from
strategic electrification.200
A second principle should focus on clarity for utilities from
policymakers and regulators as to how utility-led efforts should integrate
into competitive or quasi-competitive markets. This was raised as a
concern by California and Kansas regulators, and is discussed in the
Vermont RES as well. The Vermont RES requires utility providers
running Tier III programs to partner with private sector vendors in im-
plementing programs “unless exclusive delivery through the provider is
198 See Anne C. Mulkern, Consumer groups push Senate on Waxman-Markey’s rate-
protection language, E&E NEWS (July 16, 2009), http://www.eenews.net/stories/80415
[https://perma.cc/M6W5-N6U3], and In BRIEF: What the Waxman-Markey Bill Does for
Coal, Ctr. for Climate and Energy Sol. (2009), https://www.c2es.org/publications/brief
-what-waxman-markey-bill-does-coal [https://perma.cc/5E2V-VRNP] (detailing provisions
that allow a utility rate surcharge of $1 billion per year to support commercial scale
coal/carbon sequestration projects, and a provision providing 4% of emission allowances
through 2050 cumulatively to support coal/carbon sequestration projects).
199 Briglin, supra note 95; See John Robbins, What Ever Happened to Public Trans-
portation?, THE HUFFINGTON POST (July 2, 2010, 9:24 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/john-robbins/what-ever-happened-to-pub_b_633585.html [https://perma.cc/C3EV
-6Y9Z] (discussing the “Great American Streetcar Scandal,” whereby auto, tire, and pe-
troleum companies bought up and dismantled streetcar systems in forty-five major cities
through front organizations).
200 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30 § 8004, 8005 (2017).
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more cost-effective,” or “there is no person other than the provider with
the expertise or capability to deliver the goods or services.”201 California
regulators laid out a four-part examination of proposed utility programs202:
1) The nature of the proposed utility program and its
elements; for example, whether the utility proposes to own
or provide charging infrastructure, billing services, meter-
ing, or customer information and education.
2) Examination of the degree to which the market into
which the utility program would enter is competitive, and
in what level of concentration.
3) Identification of potential unfair utility advantages, if
any.
4) If the potential for the utility to unfairly compete is
identified, the commission will determine if rules, condi-
tions or regulatory protections are needed to effectively
mitigate the anticompetitive impacts or unfair advantages
held by the utility.
In some cases such as Eversource’s proposal to invest in electric
vehicle “make-ready” infrastructure while leaving to third-parties the
installation of charging infrastructure, utilities may naturally find a
balance of roles with third parties.203 However, some utilities will want
to go beyond this, and regulators and lawmakers may appropriately want
to focus utilities on strategic electrification to achieve energy and green-
house gas emission goals. Nevertheless, a balance will necessarily be
required to ensure monopoly utilities do not simply push third-party pro-
viders out of markets. Rather, utilities should be incentivized to pursue
partnership models, and to invest in electrification programs and infra-
structure in ways that complement other market actors.
A third principle for strategic electrification is that utilities will
require reasonable and predictable regulatory treatment in order to have
the confidence to make investments in new infrastructure or programs.
While Kansas Power & Light ultimately decided to have its investors foot
the bill for its electric charging infrastructure, there is a benefit to
having these types of investments be made within the regulatory struc-
ture, as opposed to being an unregulated business.
201 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30 § 8005 (a)(3)(E)(i).
202 California PUC, supra note 182, at 9.
203 See Eversource, supra note 187.
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Regulators can ensure that the balancing contained in principle
two is accomplished. Pursuing these investments in the regulated struc-
ture also ensures a regulated rate of return on utility capital investments.
Finally, given the scale of the challenge of investing in infrastructure
changes along the lines the Brattle Group report suggests, its seems
unreasonable to assume the private sector and unregulated investment
will fully accomplish the transition on its own. As the CPUC noted in its
2014 decision, part of its rationale for overturning its previous limitation
on utility investment in electric vehicle infrastructure was the recogni-
tion that “utilities have a crucial role in the electrification of transporta-
tion as the infrastructure support and fuel supplier in their service
territories.”204 In addition the CPUC noted “certain market segments are
harder for third parties to penetrate and the utilities may be better
positioned to develop those market segments or support third-party pro-
viders to do so.”205
At a hearing in May of 2017, CPUC President Michael Picker
asked utility panelists to address the role of the monopoly utility in elec-
trification of the transportation sector, and a panelist from Pacific Gas
& Electric summed up that “utilities are committed to electrifying the
transportation sector to achieve [the state’s] greenhouse gas goals.”206
Picker himself in a speech earlier in the year argued for leveraging an
increasingly renewable grid to significantly address greenhouse gas emis-
sions through electrification of transportation, and his staff issued a white
paper that found achieving California’s policy goals will require “enor-
mous investments in the electricity sector” including “widespread deploy-
ment of electric charging infrastructure.”207 This view was echoed by
California Energy Commissioner David Hochschild in an interview in
May of 2017 who stated, “the role of utilities is going to shift toward
204 Id. at 7.
205 Id.
206 Jeannine Anderson, California regulators wrestle with ‘dramatic’ changes, consumer
choice, PUB. POWER DAILY (May 23, 2017), http://www.publicpower.org/media/daily/Article
Detail.cfm?ItemNumber=48176 [https://perma.cc/V35D-5456].
207 Press Release, Am. Council on Renewable Energy, National Renewable Energy Policy
Forum Charts Path for Policy Progress and Continued Market Expansion (Mar. 16, 2017),
http://www.acore.org/resources/press-releases/6203-national-renewable-energy-policy
-forum-charts-path-for-policy-progress-and-continued-market-expansion [https://perma
.cc/S7XB-DH4K]; Consumer and Retail Choice, the Role of the Utility, and an Evolving
Regulatory Framework, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N 3 (May 2017), http://ebce.org/wp-content
/uploads/Attachment-8B-CPUC_CEC-May-19-En-Banc-White-Paper-and-Agenda.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FV7J-M5CS].
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transportation” in order to both “reduce greenhouse gas emissions from our
transportation sector” and “facilitate higher penetration of renewables.”208
If the monopoly utility is indeed to play the role envisioned by
California policymakers and by the Vermont RES, it will need clearer
rules of the road for what types of investments can be rate-based than
appear today. The Vermont RES’s prior approval process for utility pro-
jects could provide some of that clarity.209 Such clarity was also provided
in Washington’s SHB 1853 wherein one finding stated210:
The legislature finds that utilities, who are traditionally
responsible for understanding and engineering the electri-
cal grid for safety and reliability, must be fully empowered
and incentivized to be engaged in electrification of our trans-
portation system. The legislature further finds that it has
given utilities other policy directives to promote energy
conservation which do not make the benefits of building
out electric vehicle infrastructure, as well as any subse-
quent increase in energy consumption, readily apparent.
Therefore the legislature intends to provide a clear policy
directive and financial incentive to utilities for electric
vehicle infrastructure build-out.
The Washington law then provides for utility return on investment for
capital expenditures related to electric vehicle infrastructure deployed
for the benefit of ratepayers, with an allowance for some bonus incentive
rate of return under certain considerations.211 While utilities will always
have to demonstrate prudent investments to recover costs and earn a
rate of return, these types of provisions in Vermont and Washington laws
provide regulators with authority to set clear rules of the road to give
utilities the certainty they will need if they are to make the significant
investments required for strategic electrification.
A fourth principle, embodied in Vermont’s RES, is the idea that
strategic electrification should as much as possible provide consumer
208 Sunny Wang & Gwen Brown, Q&A: The State of Clean Energy with David Hochschild
of the California Energy Commission, GREENTECH MEDIA (May 25, 2017), https://www
.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/qa-the-state-of-clean-energy-california-energy-com
missions-david-hochschild [https://perma.cc/36SQ-MTFU].
209 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30 § 8005(a)(3)(F)(ii) (2017).
210 S.H.B. 1853, 64th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015).
211 WASH. REV. CODE § 80.28.360 (2016).
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benefits not just for participating customers (who buy an EV or a heat
pump), but for all ratepayers.212 The Vermont RES sought to “ensure that
all ratepayers have an equitable opportunity to participate in, and bene-
fit from, energy transformation projects regardless of rate class, income
level, or provider service territory.”213 Vermont utility Tier III plans en-
compass this goal, with utilities offering programs that include a focus
on low-income customers, public transit services, and partnerships with
community action agencies and fuel dealers as examples of ways to reach
more potential participants.214 In addition, the Vermont RES requires
“best practices for demand management” in order to realize the benefits
to the grid and all ratepayers of increasing load without exacerbating
peak.215 In this way, if implemented correctly, all ratepayers can benefit
from strategic electrification whether they participate directly or not.
A fifth and final principle for reform is the concept that utilities
should be given a wide berth and an open platform to pursue partner-
ships and investments that reduce emissions and fulfill the mandate of
providing customers with reliable and least cost comprehensive services.
The Vermont RES defines energy transformation projects that utilities
are required to provide in the following way216:
“Energy Transformation Project” means an undertaking
that provides energy-related goods or services but does not
include or consist of the generation of electricity and that
results in a net reduction in fossil fuel consumption by
consumers of a retail electricity provider and in the emis-
sion of greenhouse gases attributable to that consumption.
Examples of energy transformation projects may include
home weatherization or other thermal energy efficiency
measures; air source or geothermal heat pumps; high
efficiency heating systems; increased use of biofuels; bio-
mass heating systems; support for transportation demand
management strategies; support for electric vehicles or
related infrastructure; and infrastructure for the storage
of renewable energy on the electric grid.
212 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30 § 8005(a)(3)(F)(vi) (2017).
213 Id.
214 See Tier III Plans, supra note 174.
215 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30 § 8005(a)(3)(F)(viii) (2017).
216 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30 § 8002 (28) (2017).
82 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 42:43
The language here clearly indicates utilities should not be limited to only
pursuing investments that involve strategic electrification, but rather
can involve more comprehensive services to customers and a range of
potential third-party partners (from fuel dealers to weatherization con-
tractors).217 It makes little sense for ratepayer dollars to be invested in
a heat pump without allowing for consideration of how to make the home
the heat pump is installed in more efficient at the same time. Utilities
should have latitude either on their own or in partnership to pursue
comprehensive opportunities.
CONCLUSION
In the 21st century the electric utility faces new challenges that
offer risk and opportunity. The old business model of investing in ever
larger centralized infrastructure has been upended by new technologies
that are by their nature distributed and disruptive. In order to provide
needed services to customers and needed emissions reductions, the
utility model must be harnessed for a new purpose.
In its white paper on energy transformation, Navigant projects
that global value of utility generation, transmission, and distribution,
and retail markets could range from $4.7 trillion in a conservation sce-
nario, to $6 trillion in a scenario that involves more aggressive energy
transformation efforts.218 However, the most interesting aspect of their
analysis in the more aggressive scenario is not the differential in overall
market value from the conservative scenario. It is instead the significant
shift in market value downstream as conventional central generation
gives way to investment in distribution infrastructure and retail services
(such as smart consumer products, electric vehicles, distributed solar and
energy storage, etc.).219 This is exactly the shift EEI expressed concern
about, not simply a shift in investments for utilities from generation to
distribution infrastructure, but rather a shift from conventional utility
investments to investments that can and are being made by third-party
innovators. Navigant describes what the “Proactive Utility” looks like in
this new environment, describing it as developing new services such as
217 See id.
218 Mackinnon Lawrence & Jan Vrins, Navigating the Energy Transformation: Building
a Competitive Advantage for Energy Cloud 2.0, NAVIGANT at 27 (2016), https://www.navi
gant.com/insights/energy/2016/navigating-the-energy-transformation [https://perma.cc
/GSW4-N9KN].
219 Id. at 27–28.
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electric vehicle charging, creating a more distributed energy network,
and moving away from the conventional business model while collabor-
atively partnering with third-party innovators.220 Navigant notes, how-
ever, that “[w]ith some exceptions, utilities have generally not been granted
much flexibility to assume significant risk when investing in emerging
technologies.”221 That statement is borne out by the earlier examples of
regulatory treatment of electric vehicle charging proposals in Missouri,
Kansas, and Michigan, and in the conclusions of the Brattle Group white
paper about the need for regulatory reforms. The time is right from a
technology, consumer, and environmental standpoint for that dynamic
to change. With careful application of the principles laid out in this
Article, regulators can unshackle utilities to promote innovation and
partnership while preserving reliability and ratepayer protection.
Some look back on the purchase and dismantlement of the electric
trolley system by automakers and oil suppliers in the 1940s with regret
for the impact that change had on our environment and the vibrancy of
our cities.222 If done properly, future generations could look back at the
effort by utilities to strategically electrify the heating and transportation
sector with gratitude for the environmental and consumer benefits such
an effort provided. For those who acknowledge the need to reduce green-
house gas emissions but might still oppose such an effort, it is critical to
ask: What other industry has the capability, capital, and motivation to
make transformational change in a heating and transportation sector
long dominated by entrenched fossil fuel providers?
220 Id. at 28.
221 Id. at 29.
222 Robbins, supra note 199; see Briglin, supra note 95.
